

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. III.

London, Saturday, 28th May, 1803.

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CONTENTS. *Maltese Question*, 769. *Cordona's Journal of the Siege of Valetta*, 773. *Colonel Graham's Address to the Maltese*, 774. *Italian of the Letter from the Deputies to the People of Malta*, 780. *Mr. Cobbett's Letter to Lord Hawkesbury on the Conduct of Ministers*, 782. *Monsieur de Tinsseau*, 790. *Proclamations relative to Seamen*, 792, 793. *French State Papers*, 794. *Remarks on Proceedings in Parliament*, 794. *Mons. Peltier*, 798.

769]

[770

MALTESE QUESTION.

The conduct of his Majesty's ministers, with respect to foreign powers, since the negotiation of the Preliminary Treaty, that negotiation inclusive, exhibits a series of acts, amongst which it is difficult to point out the meanest, the most dishonourable in itself, or the most injurious to their country; but, if, in this picture of political iniquity, any one part assumes a dye peculiarly dark, and, by aiming at the scandalous pre-eminence, breaks through the odious and detestable uniformity, it is their conduct relative to the Island and the people of Malta.

In order to obtain a full and correct view of this their conduct, the reader will find it necessary first to go back to the terms of the Preliminary Treaty with France, Article IV. (1) where it is stipulated, that, "the Island of Malta, with its dependencies, shall be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty, and restored to the Order of St John of Jerusalem;" and that, "for the purpose of rendering this Island completely independent of either of the two contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee and protection of a third power, to be agreed upon in the Definitive Treaty."—For opinions as to the wisdom of this stipulation, considered with regard to ourselves, we refer the reader to the speech of Mr. Pitt; (2) and, for opinions as to its folly, we refer him to the speech of Mr. Windham (3), to which references we beg leave to add another, to Mr. Cobbett's Letters on the Preliminary Treaty, published in the very same month of October which witnessed the signature of that most silly, destructive, and disgraceful compact (4). It was here stated, in less than twenty days after the Preliminary Treaty was promulgated, that the stipulations rela-

tive to Malta were absolutely impracticable, and that, whenever the Island should be evacuated by the English, it would most assuredly be taken possession of by the French. But, it is not the question between the nation and the ministers, so much as that between the ministers and the people of Malta, into which we are now to examine.

No sooner was the treaty of Downing Street, the disgraceful Preliminary Treaty, made known to the Maltese, than they remonstrated against the injustice and cruelty of the stipulations relative to their country, of which they alleged that they themselves had the sole right, both of possession and of sovereignty, which rights they were willing to transfer to his Britannic Majesty, but by no means to the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This remonstrance (which we beg the reader to re-peruse in page 674 et seq. of the present volume), was drawn up at Malta, and sanctioned by the people, in the most lawful manner, on the 22d of October, 1801; a copy of it was immediately forwarded to his Majesty's secretary of state for the war department, Lord Hobart; and, lest that mode of application should fail of success, a deputation consisting of six persons was chosen, and dispatched to London, with orders to present the remonstrance in person, and to enforce its demands. Early in February, 1802, while the negotiation of the Definitive Treaty was going on, these deputies arrived in London, and, on the 4th of that month, they wrote an official letter to Lord Hobart, stating their quality and their business, also soliciting an interview (5). In answer to this letter, they received, from Lord Hobart, a verbal message, through Sir Alexander Ball, in which they were told, "they would do well to procure their departure from London as soon as possible, aducing for reasons, that their remaining would give jealousy to France, and thereby impede the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty; and that he could not for reasons of state, receive and hear them at his office, but would permit them

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(3) Ibid, p. 1167. We beg the reader to turn to these pages. They record opinions highly important at this time.

(4) Letters on the Peace, 2d Edition, p. 40, n. 15.

(5) See this Volume, p. 679.

he for ever blast his fame by identifying himself with these men? We trust not; but, whatever may be his line of conduct, whatever national sacrifices he may be determined to make rather than acknowledge his error respecting the treaty of Amiens, rather than suffer his creatures to incur the responsibility which the nation has a right to demand at their hands, we hope that the Parliament will not forget, or neglect, *their* duty to their Sovereign and his people.

"We are" say the writers of a daily paper, "the very last who would attempt to vindicate the conduct of the present crazy and impotent ministry. Such a task would require the greatest effort of ingenuity. At this awful and alarming crisis, however, when the enemy is at our gate—when he threatens the destruction of our dearest rights and liberties—when he avows that nothing will satisfy him but the complete humiliation or slavery of Englishmen, the reduction of this seat of freedom to the groveling and detestable state of a French province—it is then our duty to invigorate the measures of Government. At such a momentous and dangerous crisis, party distinctions and party prejudices ought to cease, and the only spirit of emulation ought to be, who, on such a great and urgent occasion, will first meet and repel our common Enemy, and the Enemy of Mankind."—Amen! So be it, with all our hearts! We are under the influence of *no party*; we are of no party but that of our King and his faithful people. Yes, perish the man, who would not, at this time, endeavour to "*invigorate the measures of government.*" That is the very object of all our endeavours, and it will be readily allowed, that nothing is so likely to effect it, as driving from that government *weakness and pusillanimity*. But, the government, to have lasting vigour, must possess the confidence of the people. It may just sustain itself by means of their money; but, in order to make the required exertions, it must have their hearts also, and these are not to be obtained without an assurance, without "*the evidence of facts,*" that another peace of Amiens will not be made; that the interests and honour of their country will not be again sacrificed to gratify the avarice and the vanity of another set of weak and wicked ministers. Until they obtain such an assurance, they will never again give their cordial support to the government; and this assurance can be given them only in bringing to justice, strict justice, the authors of their present calamity and disgrace. True it is, that the enemy

will be satisfied with nothing short of the slavery of Englishmen, nothing short of "reducing this seat of freedom to the grovelling and detestable state of a province of France;" but, let it be remembered, that it was to this enemy, this insolent, and malignant enemy, that the present ministers surrendered the means of effecting his object (if it ever is to be effected) and that they did this, too, with a perfect knowledge of the disposition and intentions of that enemy. Till, therefore, justice be rendered them on this score, what hope can they entertain from any sacrifices or exertions of theirs? and what confidence can they repose in the government which shall refuse them that justice?

NOTICES.

Next week we shall publish two sheets, and, shall, if possible, enter fully into our proposed discussion relative to the *justice and necessity of impeaching the ministers*, a subject to which, we are glad to perceive, the public has, at last, turned its serious attention.

Correspondents will, we doubt not, have the goodness to excuse our omissions of this week. The communications respecting *Malta* shall certainly appear in our next.

* * * The readers of the Register must, on several occasions have derived great pleasure and information, from the writings which have been published therein, under the name of SWENSKA. They will doubtless remember that it was from this gentleman, we received and published an intimation of the project for the new division of Germany, several days before even the ministers had any suspicion on the subject. We have lately made some extracts from a work by the same hand: some copies of this work, which has been published at the Hague, are now received in London, and we take the liberty to recommend its perusal to every gentleman who wishes to possess an accurate knowledge of the present situation, interests and views of the nations on the continent. The author writes generally from personal observation; and, as to France in particular, his information is interesting and valuable beyond description.—The work is English, and the price is 12s. It is entitled "*Sketches on the Intrinsic Strength, Military and Naval Force of France and Russia; with remarks on their present connexion, political influence, and future projects.*"—Sold by Harding, Pall Mall; Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden; and Richardson, Royal Exchange.

ERRATUM in last sheet, p. 735. l. 29 for *Darney* read *Danby*.

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(4) Letters on the Peace, 2d Edition, p. 40, 41.

(5) See this Volume, p. 679.

"to come to his private house."—On the 8th of February they went to his private house, where they repeated, amplified, and enforced, every statement in their original remonstrance (which we again beg our readers to re-peruse); and, on the 1st of March, they sent in, to Lord Hobart's office, the memorial which will be found in the present Vol. p. 680 et seq. and in which memorial, are recapitulated all the statements, reasonings, and determinations, contained in the remonstrance.—The day after this memorial was delivered in, the deputies wrote to their constituents at Malta, a letter, giving them an account of the unworthy treatment they had met with in London, an extract from which letter we shall by-and-by insert. After, however, the interview with Lord Hobart, at which one of the deputies had freely expressed the indignant feelings of his countrymen, the deputation was better treated. They were shown about London, a sum of money was given to each of them, and having desired to be introduced to his Majesty, they were taken to Windsor, where a meeting which should, in case of complaint on the part of France, be capable of being construed into mere accident, was contrived.—After the Definitive Treaty was signed, a frigate was prepared for their reception, at Portsmouth, on board of which frigate they embarked for Malta, having, on the 2d of April, been prevailed on to write a letter to Lord Hobart, containing such expressions as might be regarded as amounting to an approbation of the stipulations in the Definitive Treaty, relative to the Island and the people of Malta, which letter was, on Friday, the 19th inst. read in the House of Commons by Lord Hawkesbury, as a sort of reply to the charges, which we have, on this head, heretofore preferred against him and his colleagues; but, so far were the people of Malta, the constituents of the deputies, from being satisfied with these stipulations, that, upon the promulgation of them in their Island, they tore down the posting bills (containing a translation of the 10th article of the treaty), from every place where they had been stuck up; and, as we have before stated, they carried their resentment against this country to such a length, that they resolved to yield up their country to France, rather than submit to the arrangement we had imposed on them, a measure the accomplishment of which could have been prevented only by the war, which has now taken place.

Such is the history of this shameful transaction, relative to which there are four points that present themselves for particular inquiry, or rather comment, for, as to the

facts charged against ministers very little doubt can exist: 1. The right, on which the ministers proceeded in making the arrangement agreed on in the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, or rather, to use the expression of the Maltese, "in selling them" as slaves for a political consideration: 2. The deception, which ministers practised on the parliament, by stating, as they did in the debates on the Definitive Treaty, that the people of Malta, were satisfied with and grateful for, that arrangement: 3. The shameful pusillanimity, towards France, and the more shameful injustice, cruelty, and insolence, which they discovered with respect to the Maltese, in their refusal to give the deputies an official reception and bearing: 4. The deception, which the ministers practised on the parliament, by refusing, as they did upon the motion of Lord Temple, to produce the information which they possessed relative to the rights and claims of the Maltese, alleging, on the ground of such refusal, that they were in possession of no official papers on the subject.

1. The right, on which ministers proceeded to make the arrangement contained in the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens, was, as stated by Lord Hobart himself, the right of conquest. "As we won the Island by force of arms, we had an indisputable right to arrange its government." This was the justification set up by Lord Hobart (6), under whose department the consideration of this part of the treaty more immediately fell. And, very glad indeed, should we be to be able to maintain his Lordship's position; for, much as we dislike the ministers, great as is the anger and resentment which we feel against them for the disgrace they have brought upon their country, that country must be answerable for their acts, and, therefore, we cannot but regret that those acts admit of no palliation.—Our right "to arrange the government" of Malta rests then, it seems, on the pre-existent right of conquest, which is, in fact, the least equivocal of all possible rights. But, this right of conquest is denied, flatly denied, not by our enemies, not by the unprincipled and malignant Buonaparte, nor by his worthy brother in apostacy, Talleyrand, but by our friends, the people of Malta themselves, who, though they will not "be sold" as slaves for a political consideration, desire nothing better, nothing more happy or honourable, than to become the fellow subjects of Englishmen.—The conquest, says Lord Hobart, we effected "by force of

(6) See his Speech on the Definitive Treaty, Register, Vol. II. p. 1241.

"arms." It may be possible for a right of conquest to accrue from something less than force of arms; but, at any rate, Malta was not won by the actual force of British arms. The Maltese allege, and with great truth, that *they themselves* subdued the French force, and won the Island, and that the conquest was theirs, a fact which we think is clearly established by the history of the war in that Island, and particularly from "a Journal of the siege of Valetta, written by COLONEL CORDONA, commander of the Neapolitan auxiliary troops at the blockade of Malta, published at Naples in 1801," of which Journal the following is an extract.

The 2d Sept. 1798. The insurrection against the French began in Citta Vecchia, which the Maltese took by storm, and put the whole of the garrison to the sword. They broke the aqueduct that supplies Valetta with water, and seized on the magazines of powder in Cotoner, but were not able to keep that part of the great fortress, not having formed in Valetta a party sufficient to support them. *On the walls of Citta Vecchia they displayed the ancient Maltese Standard, red and white.*

The 3d Sept. The French made a sally from Valetta, but were driven back. The Maltese had nearly gotten possession of all the forts on the side of the Great Port opposite Valetta; but they failed in the attempt, and they remained to the day of the surrender of Valetta in the hands of the French; but the Maltese emptied the powder magazines, and took away many stands of arms.

—The Maltese transported all the cannon from the different forts and batteries they had taken, and raised batteries and encamped round Valetta. They drove the French vessels out of Marsa Muscetto port, and cannonaded those in the Great Port from Corodino height, and obliged them to retire into the inner ports. —They established four camps round Valetta and batteries—and posted advanced guards near all the gates. They appointed two generals, colonels, and heads of battalions, and organized the army. —They sent a boat to inform the King of the two Sicilies of their undertaking and success, and to ask his assistance, and a supply of provisions which they offered to pay for. —The rapidity with which the Maltese accomplished these operations is incredible, and every thing was finished before September, when a Portuguese squadron of four ships appeared, the Maltese sent to them, and they afforded every assistance in their power of arms and ammunition. —The French offered a general pardon and a peace, which was refused. —

Oct. 3th. The French made at one time four sallies in four columns to attack the Maltese camp and batteries. They were from every one driven back with very great loss. —Now the Maltese felt their superiority, and only thought of storming Valetta. —The 13th Oct. The division of the British fleet appeared off Malta, and assisted them with mortars, cannon, and muskets. The King of Naples now allowed them to export from Sicily 20,000 quarters of wheat on credit, for which they mortgaged the lands of some villages. —The people of Gozo had in like manner driven the French into Fort Chamberg, and taken every other post. This was now taken by the Maltese under the command of Castagna (one of the De-

puties sent to London) the 29th Oct. —The 21st Nov. was the last sortie the French made. They attacked the Maltese battery on the Hill of Corodino, and were defeated with great loss by the Maltese, who were there alone. —The French remained thus blockaded, till the 4th of Sept. 1800, when it surrendered.

The British and allied troops did not gain one inch of ground from the French, or take one single fortress or post from them. General Pigot and Colonel Graham are here in London; let them be called on to say, if they can, the contrary. —The Maltese had taken from the French all that was taken from them, until the surrender of Valetta, and they had conquered the whole Island except Valetta and the fortresses on the other side of the Great Port belonging to it, before the Portuguese arrived by chance, who were the first that gave them any assistance. The Maltese had concerted with no power, not even Sicily that is within six hours sail. They rose and expelled the French out of every post and drove them into Valetta. —On the 19th of June, 1800, Colonel (then Brigadier-General) Graham, who commanded the handful of British troops, just then arrived at Malta, issued the following address to the Maltese, to excite them to storm Valetta.

BRAVE MALTESE,—You have rendered yourselves interesting and conspicuous to all the world. History does not present a more surprising example. Given in prey to your invaders, deprived of the means of resistance, an eternal slavery seemed to be your inevitable destiny. —The oppression, and the *infringe* of your tyrants [the knights] became insufferable. Without considering consequences, you determined at any price to vindicate your wrongs; without arms, without the resources of war, you broke in pieces your chains. —Your patriotism, your courage, your religion, supplied all wants. Your energy commanded victory, and enemies formidable to the best disciplined troops of Europe, ceded in every point to your matchless efforts, and hid their disgrace behind the ramparts. —The courageous battalions of the towns (*casali*) have, ever since, confined them there, with a vigilance and a patience worthy of the cause of liberty. —You asked assistance. The powers which act in alliance for the support of civil society, and of religion, hastened to your alleviation. Arms, ammunition, money, and corn, were furnished you; their ships have intercepted the succours to your enemies. —My Master, Sovereign of a people free and generous, sent me with a handful of men, to support you, (*sostenervi*) until an imposing force should be prepared for the reduction of Valetta; but the circumstances of the war have hitherto retarded it: in the mean-time, this is a precious moment, and it ought not to be lost. —What then is to be done to profit by so favourable a circumstance? I will anticipate your answer. You are again ready to unite in mass, to complete the glorious work which you began. —To arms then, O Maltese! be the universal cry of the island: for God and your country! Who is there so deaf to every sentiment of duty and of honour, who will not value-

tarily obey such an invitation! None, none, but traitors, or vile time-servers: such we do not desire in our ranks. That infallible voice which shall distinguish with the title of hero, every man who exposes himself for his country, will equally imprint on the names of those traitors indelible infamy—Abandon then for a few weeks, the exercise of your accustomed industry. Put yourselves under the immediate direction of *your own officers*, and under their guidance; their skill and experience in their profession, will conduct you, with the utmost advantage, to the great and important object of the *final conquest* of your enemies.—A weak and dispirited garrison, disproportioned to the defence of such extensive works, cannot resist your efforts: success will recompense your labour, and you will return instantly into the bosom of your families, proud, justly proud, of having saved your country.

*At the head-quarters at
GUDIA, the 19th
June, 1800.*

THOS. GRAHAM,
*B. General, commanding
the allied troops at
the blockade of Valetta.*

Now, from all the occurrences here truly related, from the dates of those occurrences, as well as from the form, the manner, the language, and every other circumstance appertaining to the Address of General Graham, it is evident, that the Maltese were, to all intents and purposes, the principals in the war carried on for the conquest of Malta from the French. The English general evidently regarded himself as acting in the capacity of an auxiliary, bringing, indeed, succour and protection to the people of Malta, but not dreaming of commanding them, of entering their country as a conqueror. According to his own statement, he brought with him but a "handful of men." The garrison of Valetta, he acknowledges, was no longer in a state to hold out against the Maltese, who had of themselves blockaded the place. All he does is, to urge the Maltese to an assault. He claims no share of the honour of having reduced the French to distress, much less does he affect to regard the island as a conquest, which was the ground, on which the ministry justified their having disposed of it by the treaty of Amiens. What will the world think, what *must* the world think, of a government, which, after this address of General Graham to the "brave Maltese," could give up those brave Maltese to "the insufferable oppression and sacrilege of their tyrants!" The fact is, that Buonaparté was well acquainted with the hatred, which the people of Malta entertained towards the French, and he also well knew that the knights were creatures perfectly at his disposal; from the former he never could hope to obtain the island, while from the latter he was sure to obtain it at a very cheap rate. For these reasons he chose the arrangement made by the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, to which article the ministers consented, because, without that

consent, they could not have had peace, and without peace they could not have kept their places during the twelve months, which, to their own profit, and to the ruin and infamy of their country, they have kept them.—But, to return to the point at issue; the garrison capitulated, not with the Maltese, who had subdued them, but *with the English General PIGOT*, who had, previous to the month of September, 1800, taken the command of the allied troops serving at the blockade. On the subject of this capitulation, however, we must now hear the Maltese, who, it is very evident, disapproved of the capitulation, and only submitted to it upon the condition, clearly understood between them and our commanders, that they were then become the subjects of our gracious Sovereign.—"Reduced," say they, "to the utmost extremity, from scarcity of provisions, the French garrison offered to capitulate, and to leave hostages for the vast sums which they had taken from the public Treasury, from the University, from the Monte di Pietà, from the Churches, and, lastly, from individuals, under the name of forced loans. The British General, as well as the Maltese, were acquainted with the situation of the French garrison; they knew that in two days it must surrender at discretion. And in the city there were actually found no more than a few salms of wheat, and and no other provisions whatever. Notwithstanding this, General Pigot (*without the knowledge and consent of the Maltese*) granted the garrison a capitulation, by which the French were permitted to carry away all their effects. In consequence of which, before the gates were opened, the French again plundered the city of the few jewels and effects which still remained to the abandoned inhabitants, and carried them in triumph on board the vessels that were to convey to France the spoils of a victorious people. The British troops took possession of the place, and persuaded the Maltese to lay down their arms upon the glacis before they entered the town. Confiding in the good faith of the British nation, the Maltese consigned the government of their country, into the hands of the British General, without suspicion, without stipulation, and faithfully obeying them, as ministers of the Sovereign whom their hearts had elected. As to the manner in which they were treated, they wish to remain silent; as they are fully persuaded that it will be reprobated, with horror and regret, by the Ministers of the King of Great Britain. The expenses of the war by land,

“ and the pay of the Maltese battalions,
 “ were defrayed by the Maltese; and, in
 “ order to enable them to do this, they
 “ mortgaged the lands of several villages.
 “ The Maltese, therefore, demand, that
 “ their Island may be restored to them; or
 “ that all the expenses incurred by them,
 “ for their share of the war, may be paid
 “ them, and that they may be indemnified
 “ for the losses occasioned by the war, and
 “ for the plunder which the French were
 “ permitted to carry away. We affirm,
 “ that being the principals in the war, we
 “ were the lawful captors; that every spe-
 “ cies of public property is ours; and that
 “ if, by a superior force it should be wrest-
 “ ed from our hands, the mortgages on
 “ them ought, at least, to be paid. The
 “ Maltese demand the possession of their
 “ Island by right of conquest from the
 “ French, who conquered it from the Or-
 “ der of Saint John of Jerusalem.”—De-
 “ ferring, for the present the questions which
 we should have a right to ask, relative to
 an inquiry into the conduct of General Pi-
 gor, we now ask if there be any man of
 honour, or of common honesty, who will
 attempt to maintain, that the mere act of
 making, under such circumstances, this ca-
 pitulation with the French, changed, all at
 once, our quality of *auxiliaries* into that of
principals in the war, and rendered the brave
 Maltese, who had begun and continued that
 war, who obtained the object of it, and who
 had therein lost twenty thousand men,
 while we lost not one man, merely auxi-
 liaries? Besides, if we were principals in
 the war, we formed only a *part* of the prin-
 cipals. Our *allies* were engaged with us in
 the enterprize, and, therefore, if, agreeably
 to the assertion of Lord Hobart, we “ won
 “ the Island by force of arms,” those allies
 were entitled to their share of the prize;
 and, thus is our right of conquest consider-
 ably impaired, whereas, by acknowledging
 the truth, that the Maltese were the prin-
 cipals, we acquired the Island by their choice
 of our King as their Sovereign.—It being,
 then, an indisputable fact, that the people
 of Malta were the principals in the war,
 the right of conquest belongs to them of
 course; for it is a maxim, in which all the
 writers on public law agree, and which has
 been thus briefly and clearly stated by Mar-
 tens, that, “ the auxiliary has no right to
 “ any share in the booty or conquests.” (7) —
 Thus is the right, thus are the claims, of
 the people of Malta established; thus is
 their Remonstrance justified, and thus do

(7) Martens' Law of Nations, Cebbett's trans-
 ation, p. 317.

the ministers stand charged with attempt-
 ing an act the most unjust, cruel, and per-
 fidious, that it ever entered into the mind
 of man to commit, and that failed in its
 consummation only because even this and
 other similar acts of disgrace were all found
 insufficient for the preservation of that
 peace, on which the political existence of
 the ministers depended.

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 did, well-meaning, Richmond-Park minis-
 ter, made an unreserved declaration on the
 subject. Others were shy; they wished to
 blink the question; to reserve a way of
 escape from detection; but he, honest soul,
 feeling no qualms either of honour or of con-
 science, flatly asserted, that “ the Maltese
 “ themselves did not partake in the senti-
 “ ments of the Right Honourable Gentle-
 “ man” [Mr. Windham] “ that *theirs* were
 “ sentiments of *satisfaction*, and *gratitude* to
 “ Great Britain, *for the terms procured them!*”
 He said this, too, after he had read, after he
 must have read, their remonstrance, that re-
 monstrance in which they formally protest
 against any and every arrangement that shall
 again place them under the government of
 the Knights, “ under the oppression and sa-
 “ crilege of their tyrants, which was become
 “ insufferable.” But, in answer to this
 charge, the well-meaning man now pleads
 the letter, read by Lord Hawkesbury in the
 House of Commons, on the 19th instant.
 This letter was written by the deputies, after
 the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, and
 also after they had received many soothing
 favours, including a *sum of money to each*; but
before they had had an opportunity of con-
 sulting their constituents. The remonstrance
 was an official document, speaking the sen-
 timents of the people of Malta; the letter
 could not possibly express more than the
 sentiments of the deputies, who, under such
 circumstances, with a frigate promised, but
 on board of which they were not yet safely
 embarked, must be supposed to mix a good
 deal of *personal feeling*. These deputies
 were sent to declare the resolution of the
 people of Malta, never, on any account, to
 re-admit the Knights: they did not, and

they could not, in their letter of the 2d of April, express the sentiments of their constituents: they had, in fact, no authority to express any other sentiments than those contained in the remonstrance: their letter was, therefore, unofficial, and this the Richmond-Park minister well knew; he must know it; and the conclusion is, that he was guilty, in this instance, of an imposition not less shameful than that which he practised relative to the finance, the fleet, and the prospective durability of peace.

3. The refusal of Lord Hobart to give the deputies an official audience, for fear of giving umbrage to France, was, during the debate of the 19th inst. styled "a charge too shameful and infamous to be true," and the ministers being called on to deny it, contented themselves with saying, that they had "never heard of it before." They had certainly seen it in the Political Register, but seeing is not bearing, and so they might, possibly, for once, speak the truth. The authority which we had for stating this fact, was, the following extract of a letter from the deputies to their constituents, dated London, 2d March, 1802.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SEIGNIORS.—We arrived here the 1st ult. The 4th we wrote the inclosed letter to Lord Hobart, the minister, stating we were arrived in this capital in the character of deputies to represent the demands of our fellow citizens.—In consequence of this letter, by means of Sir Alexander Ball, the minister made known to the deputation, that they would do well to procure their departure from London, as soon as possible, adducing for reasons, that their remaining would give jealousy to France, and thereby impede the conclusion of the definitive articles of peace, and that he could not, for reasons of state, receive and hear them in his office, but that he would permit them to come in private to his house, where he would hear them. We were received by the minister on the 8th of February, and he heard, with patience, all the reasons for which we were sent to London, particularly to protest to the British government, in the name of our nation, against the cession of our Island to the Order of St. John, and all the reasons for which we do not recognize the right of the Order to the dominion of our island, and the firm and effectual resistance which we were resolved to make, to oppose the return of the Order into our mother country.—To this representation the Minister answered that the English government would take care of the happiness of the Maltese, and that the result would prove to us, that the return of the Order in Malta would be of advantage, by the precautions which the English government would take to guarantee the people of Malta.—Yesterday, with the approbation of Sir Alexander Ball, we presented the inclosed memorial, No. 2. and wait his answer.—It is one day reported that there will be war, and the next that peace will be concluded, &c. We are, &c.

As the charge has been called an "infamous" one, we think it right here to subjoin the original Italian, in which this letter was written, observing that there is a slight

error in our translation, which, instead of "they would do well to procure their departure from London," should have said, "they would do EXCEEDINGLY well, &c."

ILLUSTRISIMI SIGNORI.—Eccoci finalmente in Londra. Siamo arrivati al primo del scorso Febbraio. Il di 4 scrissimo l'acclusa lettera al Lord Hobart, ministro, rilatando d'essere giunti in questa capitale, col carattere di Deputati per rappresentare le domande dei nostri concittadini. — In seguito di questa lettera, per nuzzo del Cavalier Ball, fece il ministro sapere alla deputazione che farebbero molto bene di procurare di partire da Londra del più presto, adducendo per ragione che la loro permanenza avrebbe data gelosia alla Francia ed impedito perciò la conclusione dei capitoli definitivi della pace. e che non poteva per ragione di stato riceverli ed ascoltarli nel suo ufficio; ma che solamente permetteva loro di portarsi in privato nella sua casa ove l'avrebbe ascoltati. — Fummo ricevuti dal ministro il di 8 dello scorso mese ed ascoltati con tutta sofferenza, tutte le ragioni per le quali eravamo stati spediti in Londra, particolarmente per protestare al Governo Britannico a nome dei nostri nazionali contro la cessione della nostra isola al Ordine di S. G. et tutte le ragioni per le quali non riconosciamo il diritto dell Ordine al dominio delle nostre isole, e la più ferma e valida resistenza che eramo resoluti fare per opporsi al ritorno dell Ordine nella nostra patria. — A questa rappresentanza il ministro rispose che il governo avrebbe pensato alla felicità dei Maltesi, e che l'effetto c'avrebbe dimostrato, che il ritorno dell Order in Malta sarebbe stato di giovamento per le precauzioni che il Governo Inglese avrebbe prese per garantire questa popolazione. — Teri, sotto l'approvazione del Cavalier Ball abbiamo presentato la memoria acchiusa, No. 2. ed ora aspettiamo la risposta. — Oggi si dice che c'è la guerra, e domani che si farà la pace, &c.

This paper the ministers never saw, of course. It was a letter from the deputies to their constituents; and the ministers do not deny, though they say they never before heard of, the odious charge it conveys. But, as they have tacitly acknowledged the authenticity of all the other papers; that is to say, of the remonstrance, the memorial, and the introductory letter to Lord Hobart, will not the public believe, that this paper also is authentic? Yes; the ministers will scarcely succeed in persuading any one that we have fabricated this paper. Then, as to the principal facts which it relates, will any one believe, that the deputies invented them? Are there not, too, presumptive proofs of their truth? That the deputies asked to be admitted at Lord Hobart's office is proved by the papers now in that very office. Were they so admitted? Were they not admitted to his private house? These are points which can be settled in a moment. As to the reason, the most scandalous reason, conveyed by Sir Alexander Ball, he might invent it, but what other reason could be given? The subsequent fact, too, stated by us a fortnight ago, of the deputies being taken

Windsor to meet his Majesty, as it were by accident, upon the Terrace, and which can be proved upon oath, if required, amounts to a full confirmation of all the other facts stated in this extract.—Of the ignominy of this transaction we shall have occasion to speak more at large hereafter, when we make a regular and solemn appeal to the justice of parliament: at present, we shall content ourselves with having established the charge.

4. The refusal of papers relative to Malta, during the debates on the Definitive Treaty, is the last point on which we purpose, at present to touch.—On the 6th of May, 1802, Lord Temple made a motion, in the House of Commons, for an address to his Majesty to cause to be laid before the House, “a copy of the *laws* and *constitution* of the Order of Malta, referred to in the 10th and 11th sections of the 10th article of the Definitive Treaty.”—The object of this motion was, to obtain a knowledge of the rights of the Knights and of the people of Malta, which rights, as founded on the laws and constitution of Malta, are most clearly and satisfactorily explained, by one of the parties, most nearly concerned, in the remonstrance, to which we have so frequently referred. The motion was, however, negatived upon a motion of Lord Hawkesbury, and on the ground, that “his Majesty’s ministers were not in possession of “any official document of this nature (8),” though he must have known, that the remonstrance was, at that moment, in his or Lord Hobart’s office! But, to have produced that document would, for reasons too evident to mention, have been attended with great inconvenience to those, who had the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens to defend; and, therefore, it was withheld, therefore it was said not to exist, therefore the majority of the parliament together with the ignorant part of the nation, were kept in the dark, imposed upon, and misled into an approbation of that part of the treaty, which, after having proved impracticable, has, at the end of twelve months and sixteen days, produced another war. All the circumstances which have now come to light, which have now received practical demonstration, the nullity of the Order, the inadequacy of the revenues of the Island, the inefficacy of guarantees, the utter impossibility of preserving Malta from France by any other means than that of a British garrison; all these are stated in the remonstrance. To have exposed such a paper during the discussion of a treaty, on which

Lord Hawkesbury built his hope of immortality, and by the means of which he and all his colleagues fondly imagined that they should fatten themselves and their kindred to the fourteenth generation, would have been the height of imprudence; and, accordingly, they not only kept it hidden from the Windhams and the Grenvilles, but even from Mr. Pitt! On most points they did communicate with him; but with regard to this remonstrance he was not to be trusted, nor did he, we believe, ever see it, till it appeared in the Political Register, though, we trust, he will yet hear it read in Westminster Hall.

TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD HAWKESBURY,
&c. &c.

MY LORD,—The peace of Amiens, that peace which surrendered to our mortal enemy the means of accomplishing our destruction, that peace by which our allies were abandoned and betrayed, that peace which tore from us the honours won and handed down to us by our forefathers, that peace which branded England with the mark of traitor and of coward, that peace, that odious and infamous peace, by which your Lordship wished to be known to posterity, is, thank God, now annihilated by war. You call on us for zealous support in this war; and, base indeed must be the man who with-holds such support. But, first let us settle the account of the peace; first let us inquire into the conduct of those, who advised his Majesty to adopt a measure so derogatory of the dignity and honour of his crown, and so destructive of the interests of his people; first let us be assured, that a second peace of Amiens shall never take place; for, without that assurance, all our sacrifices and exertions will avail nothing against the foreign foe, and will only tend to subjugate us, in the mean time, to the will of some selfish, ambitious, irresponsible, ministerial despot. I, my lord, am no demagogue; through all the volumes, which my patient perseverance has put together, there will not be found one single sentiment calculated to obtain favour with the senseless multitude; a flatterer of the mob I hold to be the most despicable of parasites; and, were I put to my choice, I would rather be trampled to death by the rabble, than be borne to riches and power on their shoulders. But, because I despise those arts by which the ignorant are cajoled; because I hold in contempt the empty noise about liberty; because I adopt, even to the letter, the obligations of obedience to my Sovereign, imposed by the doctrines of the church in which I had the happiness to be

(8) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1235.

born and educated; it does not thence follow, that I am content to be a slave; it does not follow, that I set no value on real freedom; it does not follow that I am passively to yield implicit obedience to a fellow subject, who, by whatever means, assumes despotic sway over both my Sovereign and myself, which, however the truth may be disguised, is really the case, if there be no *substantial* responsibility attached to the conduct of a minister, and if that responsibility is not called for, with respect to the Treaty of Amiens and the subsequent negotiations with France.

Under the influence of these sentiments it is, my lord, that I have determined to use the utmost of my exertions for obtaining that justice, which, on this account, the nation has, in my opinion, a right to demand. But, there are previous steps to be taken. The grounds of this demand should be first stated; the culpability of ministers should first be regularly established; the discussions in parliament should be patiently listened to; in short, an ample, fair, and satisfactory examination of all the conduct of which I am speaking should precede any thing in the shape of a deliberate charge, in the making of which the people should be publicly called on to unite.—To furnish some materials, to arrange some few facts accompanied with illustrative comments, to afford some little aid in the prosecution of this examination, is the object of the present letter, which I address to your Lordship, not by way of insulting a falling man, but because it was to you that I addressed those observations on the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties, those predictions which are now so completely fulfilled.—In the pursuit of this object, my lord, it is my intention briefly to touch upon, I. The fatal consequences of the peace, and, II. The prominent features of the misconduct of ministers since the conclusion thereof.

I. The fatal consequences, which have flowed from the peace of Amiens, are so numerous; they present a mass of evils so great and so complicated, that to estimate each separately would require a volume of no moderate bulk. I must, therefore, as to this point, content myself with a general statement.

We made a peace, which was finally concluded one year ago. This peace, however, if dated from the signature of the Preliminaries, existed nineteen months, during which time, *we have gained nothing*, while our enemy has gained, upon the continent, in territory, Piedmont, Parma and its dependencies, the Italian republic, and, in influence, a deciding voice in all the affairs of the German Empire, whose princes and

whose kings are now become little more than his vassals. From us he has gained, *to our loss*, a long list of conquests, which, being now garrisoned by his troops, or by the troops of his dependent allies, places our neighbouring possessions in a state of imminent danger, lessens their value to the colonial proprietor, and, though these distant dominions, diminishes the resources and enfeebles the power of the mother country. Egypt, which we had re-conquered in behalf of Turkey, and, indirectly for the security of India on that side, has, by the peace, been re-opened to the invasions of France, and India is thereby again exposed to all the danger, whatever that danger might be, which menaced her from the borders of the Mediterranean. Of Louisiana France has not, it is true, taken possession. She has not, by the means of this territory, already accomplished the subjugation of the American government, to the dreadful danger, if not to the utter ruin of Great Britain. But, has she gained nothing by it? Is it nothing to have settled a dispute with America, and, a dispute, too, which would long have rankled in the hearts of the American people? Is it nothing to have discharged a debt of 30,000,000 of dollars, and to have actually received 2,000,000 more in hard cash, for the colony of Louisiana? Is it nothing to have obtained £7,000,000 sterling from the United States, and to have laid, at the same time, an immoveable foundation for the influence of her partizans in that country, not to mention the secret stipulations, with regard to commerce, navigation, and neutrality, which may probably make part of this arrangement, to the great annoyance of England both in war and in peace? Surely, my lord, all this is something; and, no less sure it is, that, whatever it be, she owes it all to your improvident and pusillanimous peace; because, through a treaty promulgated by her, previous to the conclusion of that peace, you were fully informed, that she had obtained from Spain the cession of this valuable and important colony, which you and your defenders (amongst whom I am sorry to number the Master of the Rolls) chose to represent as an acquisition of scarcely any importance, and even as one, which would operate to the *advantage of Great Britain* (1)!

But, to balance against all these immense acquisitions, on the part of France, and, at the same time, to compensate for all our own losses, since the signature of the

(1) See the Speeches of Mr. Addington, Colonel Maitland, the Master of the Rolls, and Lord Hawkesbury, Register, Vol. II. p. 1334, 1337, 1344, 1369.



Preliminaries of Peace, we have, it seems, by your lordship's declaration, "gained conviction," conviction, *that peace with France, under her present government, and with her present pretensions, is impracticable.*—Deferring, for a moment, the consideration of this point, I must observe, my lord, that the objects of the peace, as stated by those who made and those who defended it, have been in a state of constant change, from the moment the preliminaries were signed to the present hour.

FIRST of all it was a peace of *honour, and even of glory.* This was soon hooted down by common consent of all parties, and all persons, Mr. Fox excepted, who rejoiced at the peace, because it was glorious indeed, but glorious to France, and whose real ground of opposition to the present war may, I think, from that circumstance, be easily guessed at. SECONDLY, it was a peace, not of necessity; no, "to such a plea," said your right worthy colleague, "to such a plea I will be no party." It was not a peace of necessity but a "*necessary peace!*" It was a peace of economy, a peace for "*husbanding our resources.*" Your partisans, out of doors, did, indeed, openly avow, that the cause was "*a want of money;*" but this avowal in the Houses of Parliament, would not have very well agreed with the statements of Mr. Pitt; and, therefore, such a mode of expression and of arguing was adopted as did not amount to an explicit acknowledgment of the fact, but which, did nevertheless leave that fact to be clearly understood. THIRDLY, it was a peace of "*sincerity and durability.*" The fashionable assertion was, that it had "*left nothing to higgie about.*" This must be fresh in every one's memory. How often, my lord, were the persons who opposed the peace reviled for their "*unfounded suspicions*" relative to the sincerity of France? Who can have forgotten the harsh, not to say foul, language made use of, on one of these occasions against Mr. Elliot, by the late Attorney-General, whose speech, every one allowed, smelt strongly of the brief? FOURTHLY, it was a peace of "*security.*" There were even some feeble attempts made by Lord Castlereagh towards making out "*indemnity for the past and security for the future;*" but, in this his lordship's success fell short of his zeal; and, therefore, the House was very prudently content with security alone. FIFTHLY, after some little experience, of a nature not very promising, it sunk, all at once, down to a "*peace of experiment,*" at which point, in the opinions of some persons, it finally made its exit. And, my lord, I must confess, that

any peace, whatever might be its terms, made with the regicide republic of France and the rebel who has usurped its government, must necessarily have been a peace of experiment; but, the very circumstances which rendered it so, ought to have prevented the stipulations, in virtue of which the enemy obtained a surrender of our conquests, while he retained all his own, and while he extended his territory and his influence, to an amazing extent, even in the interval between the conclusion of the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties. To have made the experiment rational, the terms should have left both parties in possession of all their acquisitions, or have made the restoration of conquests reciprocal, as well with respect to time, as to extent of territory, power, and political influence. But, such were the terms of your peace, my lord, that the enemy, the implacable enemy of our country kept all, whereas we, in order to make a trial of his sincerity, began by surrendering our means of offence and of defence into his hands, and the moment that the surrender was completed, or that we would surrender no more, the experiment ceased, and the peace of experiment became a war of necessity.

As to all these objects, then, my lord, the peace has failed. It is now unanimously agreed, that the peace was neither glorious nor honourable, except with respect to the enemy: that it has produced no saving in a pecuniary point of view, that it has not, to use the phrase of the well-meaning Mr. Addington, "*husbanded our resources against another day of trial,*" is lamentably, pitiously notorious: that it has discovered no sincerity, on the part of France, and that it has not been of long duration, you will not deny, for you now declare that the Consul has never ceased to show a hostile mind, and we well know that even the name of peace has had but a twelve months existence: as an experiment, too, it has failed in every sense of the word, except that it has afforded the nation dear-bought experience of the effects of committing its interests and its honour to the care of "*safe politicians,*" of ignorant, low-minded, selfish men, chosen according to the recommendation of the pious Wilberforce, out of "*the middling class of society,*" in which respect the experiment has succeeded even, I should suppose, beyond the expectation and the wishes of that saint-like personage himself.

There has, however, as I before observed, been discovered, in the late parliamentary discussions, a SIXTH object of the peace, which, to the great consolation of that pro-

sound statesman, Lord Castlereagh, and to the no small amusement of his hearers, has, it seems, been completely accomplished; to wit, "*conviction*," a conviction, that peace with Buonaparté is impracticable! In whom, I pray you, my lord, has this conviction been produced? Not in the Windhams and Grenvilles, for they stood in no need of it; they possessed this conviction before; all the doubts which they might entertain were satisfactorily removed by the conduct of France and her usurper between the signing of Preliminary and that of the Definitive Treaty. Not in the Foxes and Wilberforces, as does, I think, pretty clearly appear from the division on the address to the throne. It is in the people, then, the unthinking people, the ministers inclusive, that this salutary conviction has been produced. As to the ministers, I readily grant the fact; but, with respect to the people, my denial is as positive as words can convey.—Previous to the signature of the Preliminary Treaty, the scarcity of provisions, which the very ignorant only had ascribed to the war, had been removed by a most abundant and fortunate harvest; and, the people of this country, properly so called, were, while even the issue of the Egyptian campaign was yet doubtful, perfectly reconciled to a continuation of the contest, till a safe and honourable peace, wearing all the aspects of durability, could be obtained. Not a single remonstrance or petition, against the continuation of the war, had been presented from any one part of the kingdom; no sound of complaint was heard; and, in Parliament, the opposition to the war was reduced to a much smaller number than that which the conductors of war will now have to combat. To attempt, therefore, to ride off on the shoulders of the people, is at once the meanest and most impudent manœuvre that has been practised even by the present administration. The Preliminary Treaty was received by the people with a mixture of surprise and suspicion; surprise, at the event, and suspicion from the unusual and unnecessary secrecy, with which the negotiation had been conducted, and which seemed to forebode dishonourable conditions. But, by means of a regularly conducted system of deception, notions totally false, respecting those conditions, were inculcated amongst the people, previous to the publication of the Treaty; and, my lord, I assert, that a paragraph, in *Mr. Hiley Addington's own hand writing*, stated, that one of the conditions was, that "our allies should be established in their integrity, as before the war," when it afterwards appeared, that Portugal had been robbed of part of her

dominions, and that the King of Sardinia, the Stadtholder, and brave Vandean, had been shamefully and basely abandoned. The illuminations in London, which gave the example to the rest of the country, were begun at the offices of you and your colleagues, and where elsewhere enforced by the dread of the rabble, headed by the myrmidons of the General Post-Office. Thus, my lord, were the mass of the people of England, betrayed on the one hand, and bullied on the other, into the frantic demonstrations of joy, which you, on the 13th of May, 1802, affected to condemn, after having, by the lowest species of deception, called forth those demonstrations, and even after having, on a previous occasion, urged them against Mr. Windham as a proof of the goodness of the peace!—But, had the fact you allege been true; had the people been clamorous for peace, would it have followed that you were to yield to the clamour? And, moreover, that you were to make an insecure, an injurious, and dishonourable peace? It was your duty to lead the people, and not to be led by them. If their minds had been degraded, the fault would have been with the ministers, and with no minister more than yourself, who set the memorable example of degradation, by soliciting an interview with a commissary of prisoners, in order to lay the foundation of that monument of eternal shame, which was completed at the city of Amiens. Then commenced the humiliation of the people: then, and not till then, their minds began to sink; till then they had borne taxes and scarcity with fortitude unexampled; they had spared neither their purse nor their persons; they had given you their all, and you gave them, in return, ruin and disgrace, to which you are now adding the foulest of calumny.—*The people*, indeed! So, the blame is, at last, to fall on them! And this is the famous *responsibility*, with which you have, of late, entertained us! You have injured and disgraced the country, and now you pretend, that you were induced so to do by the desire of the people, over whom you have been appointed to exercise authority. That you thought you should please the people by the peace of Amiens, I have no doubt; but this motive so far from being a palliation of your conduct, does, in reality, attach to it its most odious and criminal quality. Your chief object was, as all the world now agree, to preserve your places; this object was to be accomplished only by ingratiating yourselves with the people previous to the general election, and, in order so to ingratiate yourselves, peace, peace on any terms, you thought was necessary. You now declare,

in the most solemn manner, that France has never, since the conclusion of the peace, ceased to discover a hostile mind, which, indeed, evidently appears from the papers laid before Parliament; but, you took special care not to divulge this fact to the people, till *after the close of the elections*. This was the motive of your conduct, and this motive now stands clearly exposed by your attempt to ascribe the peace to the people, by your acknowledgment, that the measure, which has proved so ruinous and disgraceful, was adopted for the sake of pleasing them, and not for purposes of public good, not for the happiness of the nation and honour of your Sovereign. To this conclusion, then, my lord, we are inevitably led: either you were, in making such a peace as the peace of Amiens, influenced by the wishes of the people, or you were not: if the latter, your present plea, your justification grounded on a yielding to those wishes, is false; if the former, you stand self-accused of having sacrificed your trust for the sake of popularity, or of having participated in that vile, foolish and fruitless desire which you now ascribe exclusively to the people.

Such, my lord, is the matter, arising from rather a general view of the consequences of the Treaty of Amiens, and of the conduct and motives of yourself and your colleagues relative to that injurious and infamous compact. I shall hereafter endeavour to give to the several particular instances of culpability a more minute and methodical arrangement, in the form of articles of accusation, founded on the laws and usages of our country. In the mean-time, and before I come to my 2d head (which I am compelled to reserve for another letter), let me beseech your lordship not to place any reliance on the plea, *that you could not know that such would be the consequence of the treaty*. The proof that you could have known it, is, that these consequences, *all* these consequences were foretold, repeatedly foretold to you, before you adopted the terms of the Definitive Treaty, long before you surrendered any one of our numerous conquests; and, if you ask me *why* you were to believe the persons who gave you this intimation, my answer is: because they were wiser than yourselves, a fact which is now proved, and which proof you must acknowledge, unless you choose to incur the imputation of premeditated guilt rather than the imputation of ignorance. Having deprived yourselves of the plea of necessity, you must now allow that you were grossly ignorant, or shamefully deceitful and perfidious; totally incapable of the trust, which you had the criminal temerity to assume, or more criminally guilty of a breach

of that trust. Remember well, my lord, that incapacity is no excuse for a ministry: the welfare of nations is not to be so trifled with: it is the effect of their measures, and that alone, which constitutes their merit, or their crime; which entitles them to reward, or subjects them to punishment. The whole means of the country are placed in their hands; it is for them to find integrity, zeal, and wisdom to make use of those means for the advantage of their Sovereign and his people, and not, after having appropriated thousands upon thousands of the public wealth to the use of themselves and their families, to plead want of knowledge in the exercise of those functions, by which alone they have been enabled to make such appropriations. But, in the present instance, this integrity, zeal, and wisdom, have been voluntarily tendered to them. Nothing has been wanting with respect either to person, place, time, or argument, to prevent the evils, which you have brought upon your country, and of which you have, step by step, and in the most ample detail, been duly forewarned by Members of the Parliament, speaking in their public capacity. With wilful perverseness, therefore, or with a crime of still blacker dye, you justly stand charged; and, this charge, my lord, I, for one, live in hopes of seeing preferred, at the bar of that august assembly, to the wisdom and justice of which England has so often owed her salvation.—I am, &c. &c.

WM. CORBETT.

Duke Str. Westm. May 25, 1803.

MONSIEUR DE TINSEAU.

The public are well acquainted with the character and merit of this loyal gentleman and ingenious writer, who, some time ago, published, in London, an excellent work entitled, "*The Empire of Germany, divided into Departments, under the Prefecture of the Elector of * * **," a translation of which work is inserted in Vol. II. of the Register. On another work of Mr. Tinsseau, forming a sequel to that which we have just mentioned, and which work was also published and translated like the former, a French paper, entitled the CLEF DU CABINET, has made the following remarks, in reply to which we have below published a letter from Mr. Tinsseau.

Extract from the Clef du Cabinet of the 17th of May, 1803.—"It is well to know, that this Mr. Tinsseau is one of the most incorrigible beings in existence. He has been seen to figure, very actively, in all the conspiracies against the French government; he is even regarded as the

" inventor of those mild and gentle means,
 " employed in the affair of the 3d Nivôse
 " [the Infernal Machine], and he is at pre-
 " sent more eager than ever to raise up
 " enemies against France.—He begins
 " his work with a violent invective against
 " the consular government; draws a pic-
 " ture of the defensive and offensive situa-
 " tion of France, and, concludes with con-
 " juring the maritime powers to block up
 " by sea, France, Spain, and the Batavian
 " Republic; to seize on all their vessels;
 " to stop those of other nations trading
 " with them; and, finally, he exhorts Rus-
 " sia to trade exclusively with Great Bri-
 " tain, and to have no commerce or con-
 " nexion with France.—At a time when
 " the greatest part of the emigrants have
 " returned, and have been reconciled to the
 " government, it is perfectly pitiful and
 " ridiculous to see Mr. Tinseau, in Eng-
 " land, and the wedded Abbé Delille, in
 " France, writing, the former, a manifesto
 " to rally an external war against his coun-
 " try, and the latter, a plaintive poem, to
 " excite afresh internal dissensions. Mr.
 " Tinseau has, over the Abbé, the advan-
 " tage of being one of the most able engi-
 " neers in Europe; but, with the mar-
 " ried Abbé he amply participates in a fa-
 " naticism, which has deprived him of all
 " sober judgment."

To the Editor of the Register.

SIR,—Accused of a very serious fact by the *Clef du Cabinet*, I think myself called on to deny it in English, because the calumnies of that and other Consular Gazettes are constantly repeated as truths, in the *Argus*, and in Bell's *Weekly Messenger*, the latter of which is, I understand, the only English paper that has the honour to be permitted to circulate in France.—If the author of the work in question really be *pitiful*, *ridiculous*, and *fanatically mad*, those who waste their time in attempting to refute him, will, I imagine find it difficult to persuade their readers, that they themselves are persons of sentiments very dignified, or of judgment very well matured; while, from their invectives, most people will be apt to conclude, that the author has truly exposed the views, the means, and the hidden decrepitude of the Consular government.

Hinc mihi prima mali fabes; hinc semper Ulysses
 Criminibus terrere novis.

Asking pardon of the shade of Ulysses, for having compared him to Buonaparté, and throwing aside, with contempt, the abuse of the *Clef du Cabinet*, I come to the imputation of being the inventor of the expedition of the infernal machine, of that expedition

for which seventy of the jacobins, heretofore friends and brothers of the First Consul, have been sent to Madagascar, though, two months afterwards, several royalists were condemned and shot to death, as being the sole authors of the deed; of that expedition, in short, of which, it seems, I am, at last, the inventor.—It is not for me to pass judgment on this deed; it is an affair which has passed in France, between Frenchmen and Frenchmen, and can only be estimated and tried by French maxims and French laws; but, I solemnly declare, upon my honour, that I never had, at any time, either directly or indirectly, any concern in the act, nor ever heard of it, except in the same way as the public in general: and I further declare, that I have never, in even the slightest degree, participated in the alarm of the senators, the counsellors of state, prefects, spies, Mamelukes, &c. &c. as to the danger, to which was exposed a head so precious as that of the *first*, and, I hope, *last*, Consul of France: moreover, I declare, that, if he had fallen, his fall would not have excited in me the least regret, all my pity having before been exhausted on the thousands of my countrymen slaughtered at Toulon, in 1793, and at Paris on the 13th Vendémiaire, or sent to a death, useless to their country, on the burning sands of Egypt, and pestiferous soil of St. Domingo. It is not my fault if Pygmalion and Cromwell changed beds every night, or that Lady Macbeth saw on her hands indelible stains of blood. In short, I have never assassinated myself nor caused assassination, and, accordingly, I have never dreamt in the night, nor thought in the day, that any one intended to assassinate me.—I am, Mr. Editor, yours, &c.

CHR. TINSEAU.

London, May 25, 1803.

DOMESTIC.

Whitehall, April 19.—The King has been pleased to grant unto the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Cavan, Major-General of his Majesty's Forces, his Royal License and Permission that he may receive and wear the Badge of the Order of the Crescent, transmitted to his Lordship by the Grand Seigneur:—And also to command, that his Majesty's concession and declaration, together with the relative documents, may be registered in his College of Arms.

By the King.—A Proclamation, for encouraging Seamen and Landmen to enter themselves on board his Majesty's Ships of War.

GEORGE R.—Whereas it is our Royal Intention to give all due encouragement to all such seamen and landmen who shall voluntarily enter themselves in our service, we have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this our Royal Proclamation: and we do hereby promise and declare, that all such able seamen not above the age of fifty, nor under the age of twenty years, fit for our service, who shall on or before

the thirtieth day of June next; voluntarily enter themselves to serve in our Royal Navy, either with the captains or lieutenants of our ships or vessels, or officers employed on shore for raising men for the service of our Navy, shall receive, as our Royal Bounty, the sum of five pounds each man: and all such ordinary seamen, fit for our service, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of two pounds ten shillings each man: and all such able bodied landmen, not above the age of thirty-five, nor under the age of twenty years, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of thirty shillings each man, as our Royal Bounty, in lieu of the bounties promised in our Royal Proclamation dated the seventh day of March last; such respective sums to be paid them by the respective Clerks of the Cheque residing at the ports where the ships or vessels on board which such seamen and landmen may be appointed to serve, shall be immediately after the third muster of such seamen or landmen; And we do declare, that the qualifications of the seamen and landmen so entering themselves, shall be certified by the Captain, Master, and Boatswain of the ship or vessel on board which they shall be appointed to serve: And for prevention of any abuses, by any persons leaving the vessels to which they shall belong, and entering themselves on board any other our ships or vessels, in order to obtain the said bounty money, we do hereby declare and command, that such seamen and landmen belonging to any of our ships or vessels, as shall absent themselves from any of the said ships or vessels to which they shall belong, and shall enter themselves on board any other of our said ships or vessels, in order to obtain the said bounty, shall not only lose the wages due to them in the ships or vessels they shall leave, but also be punished according to their demerits.—Given at our Court at the Queen's Palace, the *sixteenth day of May*, one thousand eight hundred and three, and in the *forty-third year of our reign*.—God save the King.

By the King.—A Proclamation.

GEORGE R.—Whereas we are informed, that great numbers of mariners and seafaring men, our natural-born subjects, are in the service of divers Foreign Princes and States, to the prejudice of our Kingdom: And whereas attempts may be made to seduce some of our subjects, contrary to their allegiance and duty to us, to enter on board ships or vessels of war, or other ships or vessels belonging to the French and Batavian Republics, with intent to commit hostilities against us or our subjects, or otherwise to adhere, or give aid or comfort to our enemies upon the sea: Now we, in order that none of our subjects may ignorantly incur the guilt and penalties of such breaches of their allegiance and duty, have thought it necessary, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this our Royal Proclamation, hereby notifying and declaring, that all persons, being our subjects, who shall enter or serve, or be found on board any ships or vessels of war, or other ships or vessels belonging to the French or Batavian Republics, with intent to commit hostilities against us or our subjects, or who shall otherwise adhere, or give aid or comfort to our enemies upon the sea, will thereby become liable to suffer the pains of death, and all other pains and penalties of high treason and piracy; and we do hereby declare our Royal Intention and firm Resolution to proceed against all such offenders according to law.—Given at our

Court at the Queen's Palace, the *sixteenth day of May*, one thousand eight hundred and three, in the *forty-third year of our reign*.—God save the King.

The same Gazette contains an Order of the Privy Council for issuing Letters of Marque and General Reprisals against France (see the Order in this sheet under the head of *Public Papers*); also an Order of Council (see the same head) for laying an embargo on all vessels belonging to the French and Batavian Republics, or destined to any country occupied by the armies of France.—Besides these, the same Gazette contains Orders for preventing the exportation of warlike and naval stores, with some exceptions respecting Africa.—A proclamation is also inserted for electing a Scotch Peer in lieu of the Earl of Dumfries.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT have published, in the form of a communication to the Legislative Body, a paper tracing the conduct of the British government from the conclusion of the peace to the breaking-off of the late negotiation, to which they have prefixed all the papers relative to the negotiations of the Treaty of Amiens, and, indeed, every document relating to negotiations with England, from Buonaparté's insolent letter to the king to the present time. Some of these documents are extremely interesting; but, the series should, by no means be broken, and, the limits of the weekly part of our work does not admit of their insertion entire: in the Supplement to the Volume we shall give them, of course, with great accuracy.—Upon a perusal of them we discover nothing to strengthen the cause of the usurper against England; but much, very much, still to weaken the cause of the English ministers with respect to their country.—We shall, occasionally refer to these papers, and, perhaps, in our next, give an analysis of some of them. The declaration of the French government we shall certainly publish with delay; but, as the close of our 3d volume is so near at hand, our readers will not have long to wait for the series complete.

IN THE PARLIAMENT, the debates have been animated and interesting. Every one who has spoken, in these debates, and who approved of the Definitive Treaty, has, as far as we have observed, declared his regret for having given it that approbation, with the exception of the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Stanhope, Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Pitt. Why the four former adhered to their opinion we need not say; the reason was very well explained by Mr. Fox, upon the first arrival of the treaty. Mr. Pitt continued to call it "*a peace of experiment*," and, as far as that ground will carry him, we greatly fear, he intends to endeavour to sup-

port the ministers. Mr. Windham, Lord Grenville, and their friends, gave their hearty support to the address, because, as they explicitly declared, they did not regard it as pledging them, in the smallest degree, to approve of the conduct of the ministry, either as to the Treaty of Amiens, or their subsequent measures relative to France. — On the Treaty of Peace, Messrs. Pitt and Fox, almost for the first time for twenty years past, spoke and voted on the same side. They are now again in opposition to each other; the unhappy nation is once more divided into Foxites and Pittites; all the numerous swarm of insignificant creatures, who have neither character nor name, are again ranging themselves on the side, again becoming the lacquay-like retainers, of one or the other of these rival orators, who, after each taking his turn of secession, are now returned to the political arena, to combat and compliment each other, while the silly herd, in the galleries, astonished at their wondrous wisdom, seem to have totally forgotten, that the only measure of importance, in which this “Cicero” and this “Demosthenes” ever agreed, was that by which the interest, the power, and the honour of England were bartered for a peace of three hundred and eighty one days! Of Mr. Fox we had no hope; he has pursued precisely that line of conduct, which we thought, and we said, he would pursue; the man who rejoiced at the peace, because it was glorious to France, must naturally be opposed to a war which is necessary for the salvation of England. But, from Mr. Pitt we did expect an open and manly acknowledgment of his error; we did expect from him something more than an eloquent Phillippic on the character and views of our enemy, and an animated appeal to the patriotism and loyalty of the people. These were very proper; but we expected and wanted something more; something to encourage us to hope, that the sacrifices and exertions, for which he called, would not, as far as rested with him, again be rendered useless, again be thrown away, by another peace, such as that of which he last approved. Something of this sort we did hope for and expect from Mr. Pitt, and something of this sort we must hear from him, before we shall see any reasonable ground for his being again called to power. He did not, indeed, pledge himself to support the ministers as to their measures *since the conclusion of the peace*; on the contrary, he carefully distinguished those measures from the peace itself; but, it is supposed, by some, that he means *not to be present*, during the debates on this subject. We still hope, that this supposition is false;

we still hope he has too high a regard for his character; but, should this hope prove unfounded, we shall indeed despair of ever again seeing him act that great and high-minded part, which is absolutely necessary in the statesman, who is to deliver this country from the dangers, with which it is now threatened. These common-place party manœuvres, this indulgence in adhering to family and personal connexion, are very ill suited to the times, and to the cause, in which the people are called on to make sacrifices, which they never before dreamt of. What is it to the King and his people, that Mr. Addington's father was the devoted creature of the father of Mr. Pitt; that the connexion and dependence has been handed down to the sons, who, by a judicious distribution of characters, by reciprocal affection, forbearance, and support, have contrived to keep the government in their hands, under a total change of measures and of principles? What is there in all this to satisfy the King, his Parliament, and his people? Is the juvenile attachment of Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt to be placed in the balance against the happiness and honour of a nation? Is this the mighty cause that is to stifle all inquiry, to be a bar to all justice, to render nugatory that responsibility, which is the sole safeguard against ministerial incapacity and guilt? If so, what, in reality, is our political state? Neither more nor less than that of Oligarchy, and that, too, of the most odious kind. We may endeavour, as long as we please, to hide the shameful truth; but, if the power of the government, with all its attendant patronage and emolument, can be thus rendered a property, can be handed backward and forward, and alternately enjoyed by men who hold it in abeyance for each other; if this be so, our boasted freedom is a despicable farce, we are made for these men, and not they for us; if this be so, disguise the fact how we may, they are our masters and we are their slaves. — No; we repeat, that we, for our parts, are, by no means, content with a flaming speech for war, and with a call on us for sacrifices and exertions. These are good; the war is absolutely necessary, the very existence of every thing dear to us depends upon its success, and to obtain this success, great exertions and great sacrifices are required. But, before we were called on to make them, we wished for some assurance, that they would not again be employed to our injury, to our humiliation, and to the dishonour of our Sovereign. — Mr. Addington, modest well-meaning man! He, too, calls for “sacrifices and exertions *such as were never be-*

"*fore made*;" he who, a twelvemonth ago, made a peace of economy, a peace "to husband our resources against another day of trial," and who, upon the strength, and by the means, of that peace, in which he has surrendered our power into the hands of our enemy, has taken to himself and his family thousands upon thousands of the public wealth; this is the man who now demands sacrifices hitherto unheard-of, in order to carry on a war to cure the defects of that very peace! And, shall we be thus treated, shall we be led along from folly to folly, from evil to evil, without making any inquiry, without obtaining any redress, without any assurance or any hope, that the dangers we are called on to resist and remove will not be augmented a hundred fold by another treaty of Downing Street and of Amiens? If we are asked what we want, our answer is ready: "indemnity for the past and security for the future:" indemnity, by an inquiry, into the conduct of those who have produced the necessity for such great and hitherto unheard-of sacrifices; a solemn, legal inquiry, and a just, a strictly just decision, according to the laws and usages of the realm. The best security for the future would be, first of all the removal from power of those persons, every one of those persons, who were concerned in advising the peace. This is a preliminary step; and, till it is taken, not a shilling more should be voted by the Parliament. The next thing that naturally presents itself, is, to give the power into the hands of those, who disapproved of the peace, who had the wisdom to perceive, and the uprightness, public-spirit and loyalty, to warn the nation against the consequences which have now come to pass. On this point, however, we would not be very tenacious: provided the makers of the peace of Amiens were completely excluded, and that men acting upon the *principles* of Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham were to assume the reins of government, the mere circumstance of *persons* would be of little weight with any body but those who are actuated by some foolish or sinister motive, who are vain of wearing the livery of a great man, or who are seeking a market for their adulation and their influence, and, of such persons, in the approaching times, the opinion and the exertions will be found to be of very little value. —As a further security, we could wish, too, for something like a defined *object* of the war; some security, that it shall not be a little, low, peddling, selfish object, in which no foreigner upon the face of the earth can wish us to succeed. Unless we can, before we lay down our arms, effect a total altera-

tion in our state relative to France, it is perfectly useless to take them up; and, this alteration is not to be effected by a war merely for Malta, or for any other place or thing, the obtaining of which shall appear to redound only to our own advantage. With respect to ourselves, too, men of information, indeed, know, that war is become necessary in order to save the monarchy from destruction; the financier knows, that public credit, that "credit, capital, and confidence," which were to be our rock of defence, must have perished by a continuation of the peace; the merchant and ship-owner rejoice at the war as a means of restoring trade and navigation; but, as the matter now stands, the mass of the people, the husbandmen and the hard-labouring artizans, who, when the day of trial arrives, will be found to be the bones and sinews of the country; they will not, without further and fuller explanation, ever believe, that they are called on to go to war for any thing but the Island of Malta, and that Island they will never estimate by any other standard than the number of its inhabitants and the produce of its soil.—Some object, therefore, some great and definite object, which shall fill the minds and engage the hearts of the people and, at the same time, command the good wishes of all the virtuous and gallant part of mankind; some such object as this, and nothing short of such an object, will, in our opinions, ever lead us to a successful termination of the present contest.

POSTSCRIPT.

The readers of the Register will, I trust, hear, with great satisfaction, that the prosecution of the ingenious, the zealous, and loyal Mr. PELTIER, has been dropped. The Term has passed, without his being called up to receive judgment, and, of course, he is discharged. Some persons will probably imagine, that the rupture between the two countries has produced this pleasing result of an affair which must have given great pain to all honourable men; but, though in declaring my opinion to the contrary, I must necessarily take some little merit to myself, I do sincerely believe, that, unless the Attorney General had, in the interval between the trial and the expiration of the Term, been convinced, that the prosecution was not founded in the spirit of the law of the land, he would, notwithstanding the change of circumstances, have demanded punishment; for I am persuaded, that, whatever motives might influence the ministers, the case being once in his hands, justice would never have been made to bend to political considerations. In fact, I am myself fully convinced, that the doctrine which I laid

down on the subject, was found to be so clear, established by arguments so entirely incontrovertible, that to have proceeded to punishment would have been universally regarded as a most flagrant violation of justice in the present case, and would, moreover, have opened a door for endless complaints and unlimited ministerial oppression:—I beg to be understood as not to say, this by way of boast. I am very far from wishing to be thought learned in the law, with which I never desire to have any thing to do, particularly with *the law of libels*; and, I only state my opinion as to the effect of my defence of Mr. PELTIER, in order to remind my readers of what *might* have been done by his advocate at the bar.—With respect to Mr. PELTIER, though he has, to the honour of the Attorney General and of the law of England, found *personal* protection against the vengeance of Buonaparté and the pusillanimity of our ministers, in *property* he must have considerably suffered. His time, his mind, his means, have been expended in a long, anxious, and expensive attendance on, and provision for his defence. His affairs must have suffered much from the state of uncertainty, in which he so long has been kept; and, though I know little, or rather nothing, of the intentions of himself and his friends, I trust that there will be found liberality enough to produce him a compensation. That we should honour and cherish him, there can be no better proof, than that he is hated and dreaded by Buonaparté; and, when to this consideration is added that of his having suffered in our country and for our own cause, that cause for which we are now again at war, I should be ashamed to doubt of his obtaining, in some way or other, full and adequate reparation and reward.

WM. COBBETT.

NOTICES.

VERITAS, on the Navy, shall appear next week without fail.

The address TO THE PUBLIC, on the conduct of Lord St. Vincent relative to the Mediterranean shall also appear.

A LAYMAN, on the Clergy-Bill, shall be inserted, if we have room for some remarks, on it, without which it would be, in us, an unjustifiable act to publish it to the world. We, too, could have wished the bill to undergo some further alterations; but, the dislike which we have to this measure, is founded, in most respects, upon reasons *exactly opposite* to those advanced by this writer; and

this circumstance tends to show, that if the framer of the bill had given way to every adviser, he would have furnished a remarkable illustration of the fable of the man, suffering under the accumulated sin and sorrow of a double marriage. In short, we had ourselves, an intention of offering some suggestions on this bill, particularly on the clause relative to parsonage-houses, which, we fear, will suffer great dilapidation and decay from it; but, when we came to hear the opinions of others, we found, that if the advice of all of us were listened to, the bill would soon be reduced to blank paper. Agreeing, therefore, with this brother layman, that some law on the subject is absolutely necessary, and having got the better of our own desire to be heard in regulating the affairs of the Church, we hope he will not think it altogether unreasonable, if we exhort him to make a similar sacrifice.

MONSIEUR TINSSAU has in the press, and we understand, will publish, next week, an "Apologie des Royalistes Emigrés, contre le libelle diffamatoire, publié sous le nom d'Amnistie, par le nommé Napoléon Buonaparté, alias, Buonaparté d'Ajaccio, se disant Consul de France."—A work of this sort was very much wanted in this country, where very erroneous opinions are, by some persons, entertained respecting the Amnesty of Buonaparté, which is, in reality, an act of cruelty and of perfidy.

THE SKETCHES OF SWENSKA, which we noticed last week, as being for sale in London, will be found particularly useful in examining the views of Russia relative to France. We cannot but repeat, that every politician should be in possession of this book. Mark, too, the author's predictions with respect to the views of Russia, on the side of Turkey and India, and compare what he says, with the events now passing in that quarter.

We have to apologize to our Readers for having almost entirely filled up this sheet with our remarks on different subjects, to the exclusion of more solid and useful matter; but, in our next, which will consist of two sheets, we hope to be able to make reparation.

* * The first Volume of this Work is now reprinted, and will be ready for delivery on Monday next.—Both FIRST and SECOND Volumes, together with the foregoing Numbers of the THIRD, may be had of HARDING, Pall Mall, BAGSHAW, Bow Street, and RICHARDSON, Royal Exchange.